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CS

22 July 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT: Big Systems Planning

1. The other day Bob Wattles presented to the Director the issue of location of the [] and there was some discussion of NPIC's needs in this context. I very much appreciate your inviting me to this session.

2. The legitimacy of placing [] NPIC in juxtaposition some day is clear as are the financial tactics. There are several other considerations which should also influence the approach you take on this matter. I am encouraged to make these points as a result of NPIC's discussions during [] visit there last week. When the subject of [] explorations was raised, it was clear that our people had not thought through the analytic rationale associated with the process or handling considerations involved in a marriage of []

The case for exploratory funds in the FY72 and FY73 budgets of [] respectively was not made. I'm very sensitive to this and so we encouraged Ed Proctor to request [] to support a task force and special studies to look into the analytic implications of [] information. I believe this task force should start now and relate its findings to any consideration of NPIC plants, locations, etc.

3. Granted that we need a special center and specialized people for handling the photographic art forms [] the question is how we can assure that the physical plant, the A&E for which we are proposing [] is responsive to the analytic requirements? Mr. Kerr has been appointed by the DDI, COMIREX has probed some of the issues, other aspects have been identified by [] but the fact remains that we have simply not yet postulated in a real sense the analytic task for []

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4. On the larger question of the community and the multiple systems already collecting and planned for the 70's and 80's which I mentioned to General Cushman, the correlations of information these systems will produce should be highly productive to our analytic product. These correlations will reduce uncertainty and provide intelligence through computer and statistical manipulation which is unavailable today [REDACTED] The processing method, plant layout and analytic task are yet to be defined but we should start at the task now.

5. Have we really looked at options? To be more specific and relating it to the Director's briefing by Wattles, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Such assessment might even show that a sound option, albeit difficult, would be to have NPIC housed inside Langley with our other analysts and the CS moved to alternate locations. A principle underlying the OMB report on the community emphasized a DCI managing of the community from his processing and analytic base. The principle is sound. Our analytic expectations will have an important influence on any plant we plan. What are they for the 80's? As a practical point, without a better parsing on these considerations, I doubt that we are likely to get funds from OMB for NPIC A&E in FY 1973 or FY 1974.

6. DOD has made mistakes in planning its big systems. Mr. Mahon referred to these in our recent hearing; i. e., "committing systems to production while major uncertainties of method and use remain unsolved, and authorizing engineering development and plant construction before the analytic requirements are understood or defined." We cannot afford to ignore these lessons.

7. The leadership pattern in this case depends on the Director. Without new authorities, he can take the initiative to assure that the community's institutional planning for the absorption of all systems is underway and he can give visibility, insofar as possible, to the issues and costs. The place to start is not building plants alone, but rather in defining the CIA and community analytic requirements and methodology in the light of:

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b. Foreseeable technologies (computer programming, communications links, equipments such as light tables.)

c. Relationships of geographic locations of processing elements (NSA, NPIC, ELINT centers, etc.) to the analytic forces who use the data (DIA, CIA). (In this context there is a whole range of behavioral overlays which, in our language, we call "political.")

d. Costs and benefits

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8. Now this obviously is a big bite. Probably we must do it in pieces. The construction of [] and the marriage of the NPIC [] is one logical piece. But there are many more and the Director's decision time at this point needs to be spent on more than exploring geographic areas for likely sites. It should focus on institutionalizing a hard plan from the end of the analytic and methodological telescope which, in my judgment, are the true driving forces to ultimate decisions on physical plant design and location.

9. Lastly, if you will permit a little idealism, this opportunity for leadership will set the stage in coordination and management of intelligence information for the next 20 years.

10. I urge that you take steps to have the different inputs being made on this subject systematically laid out and that you arrange with the DDCI to explore a proper institutional arrangement to get underway in the community as well as CIA.

John M. Clarke
Director of PLANNING,
Programming, and Budgeting

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Remarks: I don't expect you are ready or will want to do much about this problem before you leave but conceivably the two or three weeks while you are away you may wish to have Ed Proctor - or someone like Hank Knoche - pull together a reasonable paper or study on this. <i>John - Let's discuss this - on web. if possible</i>					
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